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Part VI 
Understandings of Fundamental 
Justice 

Extradition, Assurances and  
Human Rights: 
Guidance from the Supreme Court of 
Canada in India v. Badesha 
Joanna Harrington* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to 
appeal in a surprising number of extradition cases concerning individuals in 
Canada who are wanted for trial elsewhere. Leave has been granted in 18 
cases since the 2001 unanimous decision of “The Court” in United States v. 
Burns,1 which made extradition from Canada conditional on the receipt of 
assurances from a foreign state that a death penalty will not be imposed and 
thus, in substance, overturned the position taken by a divided Court 10 
years earlier.2 Many intuitively connect extradition with criminal law, with 
extradition being a process of request and surrender that is available only in 
relation to a serious criminal charge.3 However, the judicial proceedings in 
an extradition case are not criminal trials, and in Canada, these cases 
typically involve challenges on either constitutional or administrative law 
grounds, or a combination of both, to the decisions of committal and/or  
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Thanks are due to Nikita Gush for research assistance, to the anonymous reviewers and Professor 
Sonia Lawrence for helpful suggestions, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada for financial support. I also thank Professor Rob Currie for our various 
discussions over the years about extradition law. 
1 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”]. 
2 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kindler”]; Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.). Canada was later found in violation of the prohibition on cruel and inhuman 
treatment for surrendering Ng to California to face execution by gas asphyxiation, a death that does 
not occur with the least physical and mental suffering: Ng v. Canada, Communication No 469/1991, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/469/1991, (1993) 1-2 IHRR 161 (Hum. Rts. Cttee.). 
3 Including extradition requests to secure a fugitive’s post-conviction return to prison. 
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surrender that pave the way for an individual’s forced departure from 
Canada. Indeed, many an extradition case is in fact a judicial review 
application, put forward to challenge the exercise of state power in 
circumstances where an individual’s liberty is at stake. 
Inherent within these legal challenges are also arguments of public 
international law, given the state-to-state nature of almost all 
extradition requests,4 and the respect to be accorded to the legal 
system of a foreign state that has been deemed worthy of an 
extradition partnership by Canada’s federal executive branch. It is 
presumed that the Executive makes an assessment of the standards of 
law and justice in the foreign state before concluding an extradition 
agreement, but such assessments are not made public.5 Nevertheless, 
because of this desired respect, there was traditionally a rule or 
doctrine of non-inquiry that was applied by courts to bar the judicial 
authorities in one state from inquiring into the standards of law and 
justice in another. Although still relevant within the United States,6 any 
obligatory rule of non-inquiry has long been dead in Europe,7 and 
suspected as such in Canada, given the application of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms8 to executive decision-making.9 
Under Canadian law, the final decision on the surrender of a requested 
individual is made not by a court, but at the discretion of a federal 
Cabinet minister, specifically the Minister of Justice.10 
                                                                                                             
4 One can also have state-to-international-criminal-tribunal requests under Canada’s 
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, s. 9(1), as amended and Schedule [hereinafter “Extradition Act”]. 
5 This presumption does not account for the roll-over designation of a number of 
Commonwealth states as extradition partners upon the repeal of the old Foreign Offenders Act with 
the enactment of a new Extradition Act in 1999, nor does it account for subsequent changes in the 
foreign state, including a revolution or coup d’état. Zimbabwe, for example, remains a designated 
extradition partner under Canada’s Extradition Act, id., s. 9(1) and Schedule, despite the events 
leading to its 2002 suspension, and then 2003 withdrawal, from the Commonwealth. 
6 See, for example, John T. Parry, “International Extradition, the Rule of Non-inquiry, and 
the Problem of Sovereignty” (2010) 90:5 B.U.L. Rev. 1973. For an earlier oft-cited work, see 
Jacques Semmelman, “Federal Courts, the Constitution and the Rule of Non-inquiry in International 
Extradition Proceedings” (1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1198. For a student note on the rule’s origins, 
see Matthew Murchison, “Extradition’s Paradox: Duty, Discretion, and Rights in the World of Non-
inquiry” (2007) 43 Stan. J. Int’l L. 295. 
7 As confirmed by the landmark judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Soering v. United Kingdom, Ser A No 161, (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
8 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.). 
10 Extradition Act, s. 40(1). 
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In India v. Badesha,11 an appeal heard in March 2017 and decided in 
September of that year, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada confirmed 
that yes, there is a role for inquiry in matters of extradition from Canada, 
with the Charter requiring a human rights appraisal of the record and 
practices of the foreign state making the extradition request. However, the 
impact of that inquiry with respect to a challenge to a surrender decision is 
likely to be tempered by considerations of reasonableness and the high 
degree of deference accorded to ministers of the Crown in matters of 
foreign affairs and international cooperation,12 with cooperation referring to 
that in support of the prevention and prosecution of serious crime, rather 
than cooperation in the protection of human rights.13 In other words, while 
the Charter requires a human rights inquiry in matters of extradition, 
principles of administrative law will limit its impact. 
At issue in Badesha was an extradition request made by India to Canada 
for the surrender of two Canadian citizens who are wanted for trial in India 
on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder. Upon their arrest, the two 
individuals raised concerns as to the nature of the treatment they would face 
after surrender, focusing in particular on the likelihood of violence and 
custodial mistreatment in India, as well as an alleged lack of access to 
adequate medical treatment given their advanced ages and states of ill-
health. The Minister of Justice then requested and received diplomatic 
assurances from India to address these concerns, leading the legal challenge 
to focus on whether, in light of such promises not to mistreat, it was 
reasonable for the Minister to conclude that there was no substantial risk of 
mistreatment that would offend the principles of fundamental justice under 
section 7 of the Charter, or be otherwise unjust or oppressive under section 
44(1)(a) of Canada’s Extradition Act. By a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeal 
for British Columbia found the Minister’s decision to be unreasonable in the 
circumstances,14 but the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. 
                                                                                                             
11 [2017] S.C.J. No. 44, 2017 SCC 44, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 127 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badesha”]. 
12 The Court attributes “superior expertise in Canada’s international relations and foreign 
affairs” to the Minister, but fails to note that the office-holder under discussion is the Minister of 
Justice, and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs: Badesha, id., at para. 39. By statute, it is the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who has the responsibility to “conduct all diplomatic and consular 
relations on behalf of Canada” and “conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to 
Canada”: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, S.C. 2013, c. 33, s. 10(2). 
13 I have long argued that principles of comity and respect for international relations should 
be interpreted to include respect for both a state’s extradition treaty obligations and its human rights 
treaty obligations: Joanna Harrington, “The Role for Human Rights Obligations in Canadian 
Extradition Law” [2005] 43 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 45. 
14 India v. Badesha, [2016] B.C.J. No. 365, 2016 BCCA 88 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Badesha (BCCA)”]. 
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In this paper, I review the facts of the Badesha case, before examining 
what one may term the “other facts” of relevance, namely the nature of 
Canada’s extradition relationship with India and India’s record on human 
rights observance. I then focus attention on Canada’s human rights 
obligations, since it is Canada, not India, that must decide whether to 
surrender in circumstances where there is a risk of future mistreatment, 
leading to an analysis of whether assurances from the foreign state can be 
relied upon so as to remove or mitigate any basis for finding Canada in 
violation of its human rights obligations. In doing so, I refer to the 
judicial use of various contextual factors to assess the reliability of a 
diplomatic assurance, with Canada’s highest court having borrowed 
heavily from the “deportation with assurances” jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, albeit a jurisprudential position that is 
not without a particular context, nor criticism. Lastly, I consider the 
territorial aspects of the crime underpinning the extradition request at 
issue in Badesha, suggesting that Canada could, and should, have 
prosecuted long ago the alleged orchestration of a contract killing by two 
Canadians operating on Canadian soil, with Canada and India both 
sharing in the desire and obligation to demonstrate that honour killings 
will not be tolerated in a just and fair society. There is truth in the 
aphorism that justice delayed is justice denied. 
II. THE MURDER OF JASSI SIDHU AND THE EXTRADITION REQUEST 
The facts of this case take the reader back a startling 18 years. On June 
8, 2000, Jaswinder (Jassi) Kaur Sidhu, a 25-year-old beautician from Maple 
Ridge, British Columbia, was murdered in a rural area in Punjab, India. She 
was abducted, and later assaulted and stabbed, with her body left in a 
ditch.15 Her husband, Sukhwinder (Mithu) Singh Sidhu, was also seriously 
injured in the attack. An investigation by the Indian police led to the 
prosecution before an Indian court of 11 individuals on charges of murder, 
attempted murder and kidnapping to commit murder, resulting in seven 
convictions, although four of the seven were later acquitted on appeal.16 
Through their investigation, the Indian police also obtained evidence 
indicating that two members of Jassi Sidhu’s family in Canada were 
involved in her murder, evidence that led to cooperation between the Indian 
                                                                                                             
15 Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 8. See further “Timeline of events surrounding so-called 
‘honour killing’ of Jassi Sidhu” The Canadian Press (May 9, 2014) [hereinafter “Timeline of events”]. 
16 Badesha, id., at para. 10. 
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authorities and the division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that 
provides federal, provincial and municipal policing services throughout 
British Columbia. 
Eleven plus years after the murder on June 8, 2000, warrants were 
issued under Canada’s Extradition Act authorizing the arrest on January 6, 
2012 of Jassi Sidhu’s mother, Malkit Kaur Sidhu, and her maternal uncle, 
Surjit Singh Badesha.17 Of Punjabi descent, both individuals have long 
been Canadian citizens. They resided in a large family compound in the city 
of Maple Ridge, and were aged 63 and 67 respectively at the time of their 
arrest. It is not alleged that they played any physical role in the attack that 
took place in India. Their extradition was sought on a charge of conspiracy 
to commit murder, it being alleged by the Indian authorities that the mother 
and uncle, having prospered in Canada through farming, had disapproved 
of Jassi Sidhu’s secret marriage in India to a rickshaw driver from a poor 
family, and arranged an honour killing by hiring hit-men to carry out the 
attack.18 It has also been reported that the uncle as patriarch and lead 
decision-maker for the family had made plans for an arranged marriage for 
Jassi Sidhu with a much older businessman.19 
This case has attracted much public interest, particularly in the Lower 
Mainland region of British Columbia. Media coverage helped spawn a 
petition website and a book, both entitled “Justice for Jassi”,20 as well as 
several documentaries,21 a made-for-TV movie22 and a self-described 
“angry” rebuke of a judicial decision barring extradition, absent stronger 
safeguards, by a former British Columbia attorney general and premier, also 
                                                                                                             
17 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Media Release, “Arrests Made in Jassi Sidhu 
Homicide” (January 6, 2012); Kim Bolan, “Charges at Last Against Mother and Uncle of Jassi 
Sidhu” Vancouver Sun (January 7, 2012); Andrea Woo, “B.C. police arrest mother, uncle linked to 
cold case murder” Vancouver Sun (January 9, 2012). See also Fabian Dawson, “Jassi Sidhu: The 
tragedy of a forbidden love” The Province (September 10, 2017). 
18 Badesha, supra, note 11, at paras. 1-2, 8-9. 
19 “B.C. victim of alleged honour killing was hit, threatened, friend testifies” The Canadian 
Press (May 29, 2013); “Mother and uncle in alleged ‘honour killing’ trial threatened daughter’s 
secret husband with death: Crown” The Canadian Press (January 15, 2014); “Timeline of events”, 
supra, note 15. 
20 See further <http://justiceforjassi.com/>. The 2002 book was co-authored by journalists 
with strong ties with the South Asian community in the Lower Mainland, including Fabian Dawson, 
the now-retired deputy editor of The Province newspaper, and Harbinder Singh Sewak, the publisher 
of the South Asian Post, described as Canada’s premier English-language Indo-Canadian newspaper. 
21 CBC, “The Fifth Estate: Murdered Bride”, aired November 1, 2001; CBC, “The Fifth 
Estate: Escape from Justice”, aired January 6, 2012. 
22 Murder Unveiled (2005), directed by Vic Sarin, online: Internet Movie Database (IMDb) 
<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0758922/>. 
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of Indian descent.23 As for the timeline of the judicial proceedings, on May 
9, 2014, an extradition judge found the evidence to be sufficient to commit 
Badesha and Sidhu to await surrender, with that evidence including 
extensive telephone records as well as testimony from Jassi Sidhu’s friends 
and co-workers.24 On November 14, 2014, the Minister of Justice made the 
orders for surrender, advising that these orders were conditional on the 
receipt of assurances from India regarding the treatment of Badesha and 
Sidhu. On January 18, 2015, the Minister advised that the desired 
assurances had been received.  
Badesha and Sidhu then applied to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal to quash the orders for surrender, arguing that the assurances were 
“insufficient to protect them from the death penalty, a corrupt trial, or from 
violence, torture and neglect of their medical care while they are in 
custody”.25 Both were suffering from age-related health conditions that 
required medical care not available in prison, with both having been 
detained in custody since their arrest in 2012 to ensure the safety of 
witnesses.26 A majority of the Court of Appeal ruled that the Minister’s 
decision to accept the assurances was not reasonable, suggesting a need for 
more meaningful ways to “transform India’s good intentions into realistic 
protection.”27 Leave to appeal was then granted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in August 2016, with the Attorney General of Canada acting on 
behalf of the Republic of India as the appellant, leading eventually to the 
Court’s restoration of the surrender orders on September 8, 2017. 
Badesha and Sidhu, however, remained in Canada. On September 21, 
2017, the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed to hear a judicial review 
application in relation to the Minister’s refusal to reconsider the decision to 
surrender, with counsel alleging that new information of relevance had been 
provided while the case was on appeal.28 It is further alleged that the 
Minister committed an abuse of process by way of an attempt to whisk 
Badesha and Sidhu out of the country, moving them from Vancouver to 
                                                                                                             
23 Ujjal Dosanjh, “Extradition rejection for accused in Jassi Sidhu case denies justice to this 
murdered woman” The Province (February 27, 2016). 
24 India v. Badesha, [2014] B.C.J. No. 910, 2014 BCSC 807 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“Badesha (BCSC)”]. 
25 Badesha (BCCA), supra, note 14, at para. 4. 
26 See further the application for bail in India v. Badesha, [2014] B.C.J. No. 2882, 2014 
BCCA 452, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.). 
27 Badesha (BCCA), supra, note 14, at para. 65. 
28 India v. Sidhu, [2017] B.C.J. No. 1876, 2017 BCCA 333 (B.C.C.A.). 
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Toronto without advance notice to their counsel.29 (Under the terms of the 
extradition treaty, advance notice is provided to India).30 A hearing of this 
application was scheduled for April 2018, but it has been delayed due to 
demands for disclosure.31 Meanwhile, in March 2018, in a decision 
concerning the sponsored immigration to Canada of one of the perpetrators 
of the 2000 attack, who was eventually acquitted by the Indian Supreme 
Court, we find further confirmation that the murder of Jassi Sidhu was 
orchestrated by telephone calls to and from her family in Canada.32 
III. THE OTHER FACTS 
There are, however, other facts of relevance, most notably the facts of 
India’s human rights record given the nature of the concerns raised in the 
appeal by Badesha and Sidhu. In the section below, I examine the facts of 
that record as found in the reports of several international human rights 
monitoring mechanisms established by states. One could also draw on 
reports by reputable non-governmental organizations, but given the judicial 
respect to be accorded to comity in international relations, assessments 
from bodies created by governments may carry greater weight. I also 
examine the nature of Canada’s extradition treaty with India given that 
there is always judicial interest in any extradition case in the maintenance 
of Canada’s extradition relationships, with the courts having long accepted 
that extradition “is founded on the concepts of ‘reciprocity, comity and 
respect for differences in other jurisdictions’”.33 In truth, both aspects 
involve matters of fact and law, with extradition treaties, like human rights 
treaties, imposing legally binding international obligations that are 
transformed into domestic law obligations through the Extradition Act and 
the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
29 See further Jason Proctor, “One last, last chance: Accused in honour killing case appeal 
for clemency” CBC News (January 17, 2018). See also Douglas Quan, “Canada worked with India in 
attempt to ‘secretly’ extradite honour killing suspects: Defence lawyers” National Post (January 10, 
2018). 
30 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of India, 
February 6, 1987, Can T.S. 1987 No. 14 (entered into force February 10, 1987), art. 12(2) 
[hereinafter “Canada-India Extradition Treaty”]. 
31 India v. Sidhu, [2018] B.C.J. No. 107, 2018 BCCA 25 (B.C.C.A.). 
32 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh Sidhu, [2018] F.C.J. No. 298, 
2018 FC 306, at paras. 4-14 (F.C.) [hereinafter “Singh Sidhu”]. See also Douglas Quan, “Man 
mistakenly got permanent residency” National Post (March 21, 2018). 
33 Kindler, supra, note 2, at 844, cited in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 35. 
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1. The Canada-India Extradition Treaty 
Canada and India entered into formal extradition relations in 1987,34 
although Canada had extradited an individual to India in 1985 without a 
treaty in place.35 The conclusion of a treaty to secure reciprocal extradition 
obligations was motivated by a desire, to quote the treaty’s preamble, “to 
make more effective the cooperation of the two countries in the 
suppression of crime.” It was also described as one of several “concrete 
steps … necessary to combat terrorism,”36 with both governments keen to 
enable Indian extradition requests for Canadian-based “Sikh extremists” 
seeking an independent homeland in India’s northern state of Punjab.37 To 
explain further, India had been seeking such a treaty with both Canada and 
the United Kingdom in light of their large Sikh diaspora populations,38 
with the Air India bombing of 1985 contributing to Canada’s desire to 
comply. Confirmation that this focus was the motivation for the treaty’s 
conclusion can be found in the writings of the Right Honourable Joe Clark, 
who served as Canada’s foreign minister at the time.39 
Given its link to counter-terrorism efforts, it is unlikely that the breach 
of an assurance from India concerning either Badesha or Sidhu would lead 
to “the possible termination of Canada’s extradition treaty with India”.40 
This is not to say, however, that the treaty cannot be used for non-
terroristic crimes. Indeed, India’s public posting of a list of the individuals 
it has extradited to foreign countries indicating a total of six extraditions to 
Canada, three for drug offences, two for murder and one for sexual abuse 
of children, with these extraditions taking place between 2002 and 2007.41 
No equivalent record is made publicly available by Canada. 
As for India’s efforts vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, these eventually 
led to the adoption of an India-United Kingdom extradition treaty in 
                                                                                                             
34 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30. 
35 SI/85-190, Canada Gazette, Part II, vol. 119:23, November 13, 1985. 
36 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, Preamble. 
37 Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Random House 
Canada, 2013), at 61 [hereinafter “Clark”]; Darsham Singh Tatia, The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for 
Statehood (London: UCL Press, 1999), at 189 [hereinafter “Tatia”]. 
38 See further Tatia, id., esp. 159-64, 171-76, 189-90. 
39 Clark, supra, note 37, at 61. Press reports confirm that Joe Clark, as Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, had visited India in December 1985 to express Canadian interest in negotiating an 
extradition treaty: “Canadian Official in New Delhi” The New York Times (December 15, 1985). 
40 A measure suggested by the Court in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 19. 
41 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “List of Fugitives Extradited to 
Foreign Countries” (updated as of March 5, 2018), online: <http://www.mea.gov.in/byindia.htm>. 
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1992.42 However, in contrast with Canada, which made its treaty with 
India by executive action and without review by Parliament, parliamentary 
action was required to enable the United Kingdom to ratify its extradition 
treaty with India. The points raised during the parliamentary debate 
prompted the minister responsible to make repeated reference to the “firm 
assurances” provided by the Indian Government to address concerns about 
India’s respect for human rights.43 
An extradition treaty imposes on its parties a “duty to extradite” upon 
request, provided the request meets the treaty’s conditions. The Canada-
India Extradition Treaty is no different in this respect,44 with a double-
criminality provision requiring the extradition offence to be punishable by 
the laws in both countries by at least one year’s imprisonment.45 Various 
grounds for refusing a request are then included in the Treaty. However, 
the terms of India’s extradition treaties with both Canada and the United 
Kingdom weaken the role for an exception to extradition for political 
offences46 — an exception found in many extradition treaties47 — with the 
Canada-India Extradition Treaty including an additional safeguard to 
secure timely trials.48 The other notable feature found in each of the two 
extradition treaties with India concerns the use of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, with provision made to extend the treaty’s application, on a 
reciprocal basis, to offences “committed outside the territory but within the 
jurisdiction” of the state making the extradition request.49 As explained by 
                                                                                                             
42 Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India, September 22, 1992, UKTS 1994 
No. 13 (entered into force November 15, 1993) [hereinafter “India-UK Extradition Treaty”]. To 
date, only one extradition from the United Kingdom to India has taken place, and that occurred with 
the consent of the individual concerned, while other extradition requests have been barred by the 
British courts on human rights grounds; a situation that has attracted comment in the Indian 
Parliament and press. See, for example, Press Trust of India, “UK rejects 2 Indian extradition 
requests” The Economic Times (Times of India) (November 5, 2017). 
43 United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, July 21, 1993, vol. 229, cc. 445-69. The 
order giving legal effect to the treaty was adopted by a divided House by a vote of 123 to 38: United 
Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, July 21, 1993, vol. 229, cc. 468. 
44 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 1. 
45 Id., art. 3. 
46 Id., art. 5; India-UK Extradition Treaty, supra, note 42, art. 5. 
47 See, e.g., Model Treaty on Extradition, GA Res 45/116, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1990), 
art. 3 [hereinafter “Model Treaty on Extradition”]. 
48 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 4(4) (“the requesting state shall 
ensure that the person extradited is brought to trial within 6 months of the extradition”). But see art. 
4(5), which provides for bail to be considered and the setting of a trial date “where trial has not 
commenced within 6 months”. 
49 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 2. See also India-UK Extradition 
Treaty, supra, note 42, arts. 3 and 6. 
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the Minister of State for the Home Office to the British Parliament, this 
extension of jurisdiction meant that “[t]hose who organize crimes from this 
country cannot be allowed to escape the consequences, simply because 
their intention was to see a very serious crime committed in another 
country.”50 Both treaties also contain the usual direction that an extradition 
request may be refused if the person sought is being proceeded against in 
the requested state;51 an exception of relevance if Canada had opted to 
prosecute the conspiracy that took place on a transnational basis in both 
Canada and India, allegedly orchestrated by two Canadian citizens from 
their home in Canada, that resulted in the kidnapping, assault and murder 
of a third Canadian citizen, while she was in India. 
2. India’s Human Rights Record 
The human rights record of the state making an extradition request is 
also a relevant consideration, with the Supreme Court of Canada having 
made clear that when evaluating whether an individual will face a 
substantial risk of ill-treatment in the requesting state, “it logically follows 
that the Minister can consider evidence of the general human rights 
situation in that state, which may include reports from reputable 
government and non-government organizations”.52 (Presumably, reports by 
inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, may also be 
considered.) While the focus of this “fact-driven inquiry” remains on the 
“personal risk” faced by an individual,53 “general evidence of pervasive 
and systematic human rights abuses in a receiving state can form the basis 
for a finding that the person faces a substantial risk”.54 The Court found 
support for this proposition in the famous case of Chahal v. United 
Kingdom,55 albeit that in that case, a Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights had barred the deportation of a Sikh separatist 
leader from Britain to India on the basis of a serious risk of future  
ill-treatment having been established by reference to reports of persistent 
problems of human rights abuses by the Indian police and security 
                                                                                                             
50 United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates (July 21, 1993), vol. 229, cc. 449-50 
(David Maclean). 
51 Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 5(2)(2); India-UK Extradition 
Treaty, supra, note 42, art. 8; Model Treaty on Extradition, supra, note 47, art. 4(c). 
52 Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 44. 
53 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 
SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]. 
54 Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 45. 
55 App. No. 22414/93, (1997), 23 E.H.R.R. 413 (G.C.). 
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forces.56 The Grand Chamber was also “not persuaded” that an assurance 
provided by the Indian Government “would provide Mr Chahal with an 
adequate guarantee of safety.”57 
India is a party to the two leading international human rights treaties of 
general application, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)58 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),59 as well as human rights treaties of specific 
application to matters of racial discrimination, women’s rights, children’s 
rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. As a state party, India is 
bound to respect the ICCPR’s prohibition on torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,60 as well as the 
provisions on the rights to life and a fair trial.61 India is also bound by  
the ICESCR’s recognition of “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”62 In its 
judgment in Badesha, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that India 
was a party to the ICCPR as a factor relevant to the assessment of the risk 
of torture or mistreatment faced by Badesha and Sidhu.63 But the Court 
failed to note that these treaties also entail state acceptance of an 
international monitoring process, and that India had long stopped reporting 
on the performance of its ICCPR obligations to that treaty’s monitoring 
body, known as the Human Rights Committee.64 Indeed, India’s last report 
to this independent international body was made in November 1995, with 
the Committee ordering the next report to be submitted by the end of 
2001.65 The desired report has yet to materialize 18 years later, with such 
disregard hardly a sign of an Indian commitment to respecting its treaty 
obligations. 
An even more worrisome sign is India’s long-standing inability to 
secure the domestic change it needs to be in a position to become a party to 
the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
                                                                                                             
56 Id., at para. 102.  
57 Id., at para. 105. 
58 December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force March 
23, 1976), accession by India April 10, 1979 [hereinafter “ICCPR”], 172 states parties. 
59 December 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force January 3, 
1976), accession by India April 10, 1979 [hereinafter “ICESCR”], 169 states parties. 
60 ICCPR, supra, note 58, art. 7. 
61 Id., arts. 6 and 14. 
62 ICESCR, supra, note 59, art. 12. 
63 Supra, note 11, at para. 60. 
64 ICCPR, supra, note 58, art. 28 et seq. 
65 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: India, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (August 4, 1997). 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment,66 with India aware that its failure to 
ratify this treaty has provided a ground for the judicial refusal of a desired 
extradition from Denmark.67 As a non-party to this widely ratified treaty 
setting universal minimum standards, India stands with Angola, Iran, 
Malaysia, North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as several small 
states such as Haiti, Papua New Guinea, and Suriname. India signed this 
treaty in 1997, 10 years after the treaty’s international entry into force and 
in fulfilment of an election commitment made by a coalition government 
in 1996.68 However, as a legal matter, signature is not the same as 
ratification for many multilateral treaties, with a mere signatory not being 
bound by the treaty’s provisions, absent a general obligation to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.69 While 
disagreement may arise as to what is a treaty’s object and purpose, as a 
signatory, rather than a party, India is not bound by the treaty’s express 
extension of its prohibitions and protections to “other acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to 
torture”,70 and nor is India subject to the international scrutiny of its 
actions by an independent treaty-monitoring body, in this case, the 
Committee Against Torture.71 
“India’s efforts to enact domestic legislation that would enable them to 
ratify the CAT,” (referring to the Treaty rather than the Committee), 
receive a brief mention in Badesha,72 but without further context. As noted 
above, the wait for action has been for some 20 years, with the 
insufficiency of India’s efforts documented in India’s own reports to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, prepared for the examination of its 
human rights record by other states as part of what is called the “universal 
periodic review”. In its 2008 report, India identified itself as a signatory to 
                                                                                                             
66 December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 14 (entered into force June 
26, 1987), signed by India October 14, 1997 [hereinafter “Convention Against Torture”], 165 states 
parties. 
67 See further the Answer of the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (August 
10, 2011) to a parliamentary question concerning the requested extradition to India from Denmark of 
the alleged arms provider Niels Holck, aka Kim Davy, posted online by India’s Ministry of External 
Affairs, at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/16830/q1651+extradition+of+kim+davy>. 
68 As India noted when appearing before the Human Rights Committee in mid-1997: 
Summary Record of the 1603rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1603 (July 29, 1997), para. 5.  
69 A customary international law rule found codified in art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37 (entered into force 
January 27, 1980), to which India is also not a party. 
70 Convention Against Torture, supra, note 66, art. 16. 
71 Id., art. 17 et seq. 
72 Supra, note 11, at para. 60. 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) EXTRADITION, ASSURANCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 285 
the treaty, but made no mention of any plans to enact domestic legislation 
to pave the way for ratification.73 In its 2012 report, India explained that a 
bill introduced in Parliament in 2010 had failed to attract the support of the 
upper house (Rajya Sabha) and was instead “referred to a Parliamentary 
Select Committee which had made certain recommendations.”74 In its 
2017 report, India again indicated its commitment to ratifying the treaty, 
but noted that “the Law Commission of India is examining the changes 
required to domestic law prior to ratification.”75 As for the role of the 
judiciary in serving, in India’s words, “as a bulwark against … violations” 
of the torture provisions of the Indian Penal Code,76 a recent U.S. 
government report refers to a “two-fold rise in reported custodial death and 
police torture cases” and government inaction in the face of court orders.77 
IV. CANADA’S HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
Canada is a party to the Convention Against Torture, and thus unlike 
India, Canada accepts both an international legal obligation to extradite 
upon request under an extradition treaty and an international legal 
obligation not to extradite where there are substantial grounds for 
believing the individual will be in danger of being subjected to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.78 The latter is often referred to as an 
obligation of non-refoulement; refouler being a French verb for return, 
force or push back. These treaty obligations have been transformed into 
Canadian law obligations, through the Extradition Act and the Charter, 
with the Supreme Court of Canada having held that section 7 of the 
Charter “should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of 
protection as found in Canada’s international commitments regarding 
non-refoulement to torture or other gross human rights violations”.79 In 
                                                                                                             
73 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15(a) of the annex to Human 
Rights Council resolution 5/1: India, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/1/IND/1 (March 6, 2008), at para. 38. 
74 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights 
Council resolution 16/21: India, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/13/IND/1 (March 8, 2012), at para. 29. 
75 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights 
Council resolution 16/21: India, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (February 23, 2017), at para. 
33. 
76 Id. 
77 United States, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
2017: India, online: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277525.pdf>. 
78 Convention Against Torture, supra, note 66, art. 3(1) read with art. 16. 
79 Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 38, citing Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. No. 47, 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 157, at para. 23 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Divito”]. 
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other words, as the Court has emphasized in Badesha, “surrendering a 
person to face a substantial risk of torture or mistreatment in the 
requesting state will violate the principles of fundamental justice.”80 
However, in assessing whether there is a substantial risk of torture or 
mistreatment, the Minister of Justice may take into account any 
assurances made by the requesting state regarding the treatment to be 
faced by the requested persons, despite the absence of any means to 
guarantee in law that these assurances will be respected by the foreign 
state, or enforced by the local courts. 
Extradition on assurance, or conditional extradition, is not new in 
Canada, with the Court in 2001 recognizing a Charter-derived obligation 
in capital cases to secure an assurance from the requesting state that a 
death sentence will not be imposed.81 However, the death penalty, 
although heavily circumscribed, remains a lawful penalty under 
international law, whereas the serious mistreatment of a human being is a 
universal illegality, with the prohibition on torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment being absolute in 
nature, and permitting of no exceptions, under both customary and 
conventional international law.82 This distinction was expressly 
recognized by the Supreme Court in 2001,83 but in Badesha, the Court 
has confirmed that diplomatic assurances “need not eliminate any 
possibility of torture or mistreatment; they must simply form a 
reasonable basis for the Minister’s finding that there is no substantial risk 
of torture or mistreatment.”84 
As for how one determines the reliability of a diplomatic assurance, 
and thus its sufficiency in removing a substantial risk of ill-treatment, a 
contextual approach must be taken, involving the consideration of 
multiple factors. The mere fact that Canada has felt moved to ask another 
state to promise not to torture cannot be treated as proof that a risk exists, 
with the Supreme Court accepting that assurances “may be requested by 
the Minister out of an abundance of caution”.85 It has also been argued 
that assurances can serve to reduce the risk of torture by regulating the 
                                                                                                             
80 Badesha, id. 
81 Burns, supra, note 1. 
82 ICCPR, supra, note 58, art. 7; Convention Against Torture, supra, note 66, art. 2(2) read 
with art. 16(1). 
83 Suresh, supra, note 53, at para. 124. 
84 Supra, note 11, at para. 46. 
85 Id., at para. 52. 
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behaviour of the assuring state,86 with Canada having made public its 
view, by way of a joint submission to the Committee Against Torture,87 
that “when used appropriately, diplomatic assurances have served as an 
effective tool for States Parties to help ensure compliance with Article 3” 
of the Convention Against Torture on non-refoulement. The joint 
submission, however, focused on assurances from states parties, with a 
non-party state bound by a customary international law prohibition, but 
shielded from any scrutiny by the treaty-monitoring body by virtue of its 
non-party status. 
As for the contextual factors to consider, Canada’s highest court has 
adopted the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in the Othman 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, even though that case 
concerned the long desired deportation of a non-national from Britain to 
Jordan on national security grounds.88 Indeed, in the Othman case, 
Britain had recognized that there is an absolute legal bar on surrendering 
a person to face serious ill-treatment, while also recognizing that the risk 
Othman posed to the British public, as an alleged radical Islamic cleric 
intent on encouraging terrorism, required restrictions on his liberty until 
a lawful surrender could be arranged. This additional context helps 
explain the European Court’s view in 2012 that “States must be allowed 
to deport non-nationals whom they consider to be threats to national 
security,”89 leading to the suggestion (or criticism) of a compromise to 
support, in the Court’s words, “a firm stand against those who contribute 
to terrorist acts.”90 It is also a context that could be used to distinguish 
Othman from Badesha since the latter is not a national security case, nor 
a case of alleged terrorism, nor a case concerning the surrender of non-
nationals. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has found the 
factors identified in Othman to assess the assurance to have general 
                                                                                                             
86 Jeffrey G. Johnston, “The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use 
of Diplomatic Assurances to Protect against Torture after 9/11” (2011) 11 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 1. 
87 Joint Observations of Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America on Paragraphs 19-20 of the Committee Against Torture’s Draft General Comment No. 1 
(2017) on Implementation of Article 3 in the Context of Article 22, dated March 31, 2017, online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CAT/GCArticle3/JointSubmission.pdf> [hereinafter 
“Joint Observations”]. 
88 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App No 8139/09, (2012), 55 E.H.R.R. 1 
[hereinafter “Othman”]. The U.K. Government’s effort to negotiate memoranda of understanding 
with Jordan, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon to facilitate the deportation of particular individuals in a 
manner consistent with the United Kingdom’s international human rights obligations dates back to 
2005: United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, December 19, 2005, col. 2356-WA. 
89 Othman, id., at para. 184. 
90 Id., at para. 183. 
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relevance. These factors include such matters as who within the foreign 
state has provided the assurance and on what terms of specificity, as well 
as the receiving state’s record in abiding by similar assurances, in 
addition to whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively 
verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, and 
whether there is an effective system of protection in the receiving state, 
defined to include a state’s cooperation with international monitoring 
mechanisms.91 
In and of themselves, these contextual factors are not problematic, 
and indeed, their detailed exposition by the courts serves to require 
governments to do more than accept an assurance on mere face value. 
But the real test lies in the application of this exhortation, and a court’s 
willingness to scrutinize a government’s assessment so as to ensure a 
degree of robustness in judicial review that is in keeping with the 
absolute nature of the right to be free from serious mistreatment. It is on 
this aspect where the Supreme Court of Canada disappoints, relying on 
past holdings that “[t]he role of a reviewing court … is not to re-assess 
the relevant facts and substitute its own view for that of the Minister” 
and that the court “must examine whether the decision falls within a 
range of reasonable outcomes.”92 Nevertheless, the Court did come to the 
view that the majority of the Court of Appeal “did not consider many of 
the relevant factors the Minister considered in assessing the reliability of 
the assurance.”93 It also found the Court of Appeal to have been 
dismissive of the role for consular monitoring.94 
And yet, the Supreme Court of Canada provided no comment on the 
fact that in Othman, the assurances were provided by a state party to the 
Convention Against Torture, with Jordan having acceded to that treaty in 
1991. Nor did the Court draw a link between its mention of rights 
protection by way of “cooperation with international monitoring 
mechanisms” and India’s complete disregard of its reporting obligation 
to the Human Rights Committee since 2001. India, as a non-party state, 
is also not subject to any monitoring by the Committee Against Torture, 
which has developed a specific expertise with non-refoulement claims 
since they constitute the great majority of its caseload. The existence and 
terms of the assurances used to secure Othman’s deportation to Jordan 
                                                                                                             
91 Id., at para. 189, cited with approval in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 51. 
92 Badesha, id., at para. 57, citing Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] S.C.J. No. 23, 
2008 SCC 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, at para. 41 (S.C.C.). 
93 Badesha, id., at para. 59, and see para. 63. 
94 Id., at paras. 64-65. 
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were also given public exposure, with publicity being an encouragement 
for compliance, whereas in Canada, past access-to-information requests 
for diplomatic assurances have been refused on the basis of a 
discretionary exemption for “diplomatic correspondence exchanged with 
foreign states”.95 Moreover, in the Othman case, the assurances 
negotiated by way of memoranda of understanding eventually formed the 
basis of a legally binding treaty,96 with Othman voluntarily consenting to 
his surrender if that treaty, with its guarantees of fair treatment and a fair 
trial, was ratified by the Jordanian Parliament and endorsed by the 
Jordanian King.97 Upon those terms, Othman, or Abu Qatada as he is also 
known, was indeed surrendered to Jordan.98  
V. THE TERRITORIAL CONNECTION 
The Minister of Justice has taken the view that the extradition of 
Badesha and Sidhu must take place so that India can see “justice done on 
India’s territory”,99 and the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that 
it remains “a basic principle of extradition law that when a person is 
alleged to have committed a crime in another country, he or she should 
expect to be answerable to that country’s justice system”.100 No mention 
is made of India’s (and Canada’s) acceptance in its treaty relationship of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as a means to foreclose a perpetrator’s evasion 
from prosecution. Moreover, there remains the question as to, on whose 
territory did the crime of conspiracy to commit murder occur or given 
the transnational context of this case, on whose territories? The facts 
suggest an agreement to conspire may well have been made between the 
                                                                                                             
95 Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, s. 15(1)(h). See also Do-Ky v. Canada 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), [1999] F.C.J. No. 673, 173 D.L.R. 4th 515, 
164 F.T.R. 160 (F.C.A.). 
96 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, March 24, 2013, U.K.T.S. 
2013 No 25 (entered into force July 1, 2013), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/252502/TS.25.Cm8681.pdf>. 
97 David Barrett and Tom Whitehead, “Abu Qatada extradition treaty finalised by British 
Parliament” The Telegraph (June 21, 2013); Dominic Casciani, “Jordan Passes Abu Qatada treaty” 
BBC News (June 12, 2013); “Abu Qatada treaty endorsed by King of Jordan” BBC News (June 18, 
2013). 
98 “Britain finally deports Abu Qatada to Jordan after decade long saga” The Telegraph 
(July 7, 2013). He was later acquitted of terrorism charges before the Jordanian courts: “Abu Qatada 
found not guilty by Jordan court of terror plot” BBC News (June 26, 2014). 
99 Noted in Badesha, supra, note 11, at paras. 6 and 66. 
100 Id., at para. 35. 
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mother and uncle in Canada, and at the direction of the mother and/or 
uncle by telephone with and through relatives in India, possibly backed 
by the promise of support for a family-class immigration application to 
Canada.101 
Canadian prosecutors may tend to favour a traditional approach to 
jurisdiction, preferring that prosecutions take place in the territory where 
a crime was completed.102 However, Canadian law has long accepted a 
broader view of territorial jurisdiction, enabling the prosecution in 
Canada of transnational crime where there is a “real and substantial link” 
between the offence and Canada.103 According to the extradition judge, 
certified telephone records establish “extensive contact” between 
Badesha’s telephone number in Canada and the four principals in India 
before, on the day of, and after the killing in June 2000.104 Indeed, the 
extradition judge found there were 266 calls, lasting a total of 18 hours 
and 13 minutes,105 lending support to the view that a conspiracy took 
place on Canadian soil, orchestrated by at least one Canadian citizen, 
with the aim to have another Canadian citizen killed while she was 
outside the country. In the view of the Minister of Justice, “much, if not 
all” of the evidence needed to prosecute Badesha was available in 
India.106 However, according to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, “a 
substantial body of evidence exists in Canada”,107 with a Canadian 
prosecution, and not impunity, being the alternative when an extradition 
is barred by serious human rights concerns. This aspect of extradition 
law has long been encapsulated by the Latin maxim aut dedere aut 
judicare (“either extradite or prosecute”), embraced in the writings of the 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius since the 1600s,108 and today codified in 
various treaties.109 For more creative thinkers, a third option may also 
                                                                                                             
101 See Singh Sidhu, supra, note 32. 
102 This is not always the case, with the prosecution in Canada of a Canadian businessman of 
Indian descent who offered bribes to officials in India to secure a lucrative contract having survived 
the challenge that was “no sufficient connection to Canada to give the court territorial jurisdiction 
over what occurred”: R. v. Karigar, [2017] O.J. No. 3530, 2017 ONCA 576, at para. 2 (Ont. C.A.), 
leave to appeal refused [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 385 (S.C.C.). 
103 R. v. Libman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 56, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (S.C.C.). 
104 Badesha (BCSC), supra, note 24, at para. 8. 
105 Id., at paras. 59 and 97. 
106 As noted in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 21. 
107 Badesha (BCCA), supra, note 14, at para. 73. 
108 As recognized by the International Law Commission’s Working Group on the Obligation 
to Extradite or Prosecute, with the Working Group’s final report reproduced as Annex A to Report of 
the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/68/10 (2013), at 126, para. 3. 
109 See, for example, art. 7 of The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 106, Can. T.S. 1972 No. 23 (entered into force 
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exist, involving the negotiation of the temporary surrender of a Canadian 
national for trial in a foreign state on condition or assurance that they 
will be returned to serve any sentence of imprisonment in Canada. This 
option finds recognition in the revised United Nations Model Treaty on 
Extradition,110 and in a long-standing pan-European extradition 
arrangement.111 The existence of this option of temporary surrender and 
return for imprisonment is also acknowledged in several widely ratified 
multilateral extradition arrangements to which Canada and India are 
party.112 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is a welcome development that extradition law in Canada no longer 
speaks of safe havens and rules of non-inquiry but instead embraces the 
                                                                                                             
December 4, 1969). See also the survey of multilateral instruments containing an “extradite or 
prosecute” provision prepared by the Secretariat to assist the International Law Commission in its 
study of this topic: U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/630 (2010). Bilaterally, the “extradite or prosecute” principle 
is most often invoked when a requested state refuses to extradite one of its nationals and instead 
submits the case to its national prosecuting authorities; an option typically provided by treaty. See, 
for example, art. 3(2) of the Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Republic of France, December 17, 1988, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 38 (entered into 
force December 1, 1989). 
110 A footnote added to art. 4(a) of the original Model Treaty on Extradition states that 
“Some countries may also wish to consider, within the framework of national legal systems, other 
means to ensure that those responsible for crimes do not escape punishment on the basis of 
nationality, such as, inter alia, provisions that would permit surrender for serious offences, or permit 
temporary transfer of the person for trial and return of the person to the requested State for service of 
sentence”: International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, GA Res. 52/88, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/88 
(1997), annex, art. 4. An agreement to provide for the temporary transfer and subsequent return of a 
national would also address the point made in Divito, supra, note 79, at para. 40, that “as a matter of 
international law, Canada has no legal authority to require the return of a citizen who is lawfully 
incarcerated by a foreign state” (emphasis in original). 
111 Article 19(2) of the European Convention on Extradition, December 13, 1957, 359 
U.N.T.S. 273, E.T.S. No. 24 (entered into force April 18, 1960), as amended, provides for the 
temporary surrender of a requested person “in accordance with conditions to be determined by 
mutual agreement”. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have each lodged formal 
declarations with the Council of Europe’s treaty secretariat indicating that they will grant temporary 
surrender only if it concerns a person who serves a sentence on its territory and if particular (or 
special) circumstances require it. 
112 See, for example, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, October 31, 2003, 
2349 U.N.T.S. 41, Can. T.S. 2007 No. 7 (entered into force December 14, 2005), art. 44(12), 186 
states parties, which provides assurance that there will be treaty compliance if a state party must 
“surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State 
Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or 
surrender of the person was sought”, while also requiring “that the State Party seeking the 
extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate”. 
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view that the extradition process also serves to protect the rights of the 
persons sought.113 These rights are best protected when the Charter is 
interpreted so as to require the Minister to conduct a meaningful 
appraisal of the human rights record of the requesting state, including its 
willingness to subject that record to independent third party monitoring. 
After all, would not all countries comply if they were simply asked to 
assure us that they will not mistreat? It is worrisome that a country 
committed to a principled foreign policy does not insist that its 
extradition partners be parties to the Convention Against Torture. This 
treaty provides more than support for the customary rule that prohibits 
the sending of an individual to face a substantial risk of serious ill-
treatment. It also imposes a legal requirement for regular state reporting 
to an independent, international, treaty-monitoring body, with monitoring 
mechanisms, whether consular or otherwise, viewed as an important 
safeguard to enhance the reliability of a diplomatic assurance.114 State 
acceptance of post-surrender monitoring could also be a term written into 
an extradition treaty, for example, with an Australian parliamentary 
scrutiny committee having made recommendations, repeatedly, for the 
inclusion of public monitoring and annual status reports on extradited 
persons to address concerns about human rights observance in a foreign 
state.115 
As for lessons to be learned from India v. Badesha, it would be wise 
for future legal challenges to extradition decisions to focus on forms of 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, rather than 
claims of torture. With torture being at the very apex of the spectrum of 
all forms of mistreatment, it may well be difficult to prove that an 
individual faces a substantial risk of torture upon surrender, while 
challenges about the weakness of the evidence are even less likely to 
succeed, absent a case that suggests gross violations of the right to a fair 
trial. But the real obstacle for a future legal challenge will be the 
                                                                                                             
113 An objective clearly embraced in M.M. v. United States of America, [2015] S.C.J. No. 62, 
2015 SCC 62, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973, at paras. 1 and 16 (S.C.C.). 
114 Joint Observations, supra, note 87, at para. 8; Badesha, supra, note 11, at paras. 64-65. 
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readiness of a court to scrutinize a government’s assessment of the risk, 
with a heightened level of judicial review surely justified by the absolute 
nature of the right to be free from serious mistreatment. As for Badesha 
and Sidhu, Canada may well have wanted to support India in a show of 
resolve to prosecute those who commit honour killings, a practice that 
endangers the lives of so many women who fear retribution from their 
families for marrying an individual of a different caste or religion. Sadly, 
however, honour killings also occur in Canada,116 calling for a similar 
Canadian resolve. “Justice for Jassi”, in the sense of a judicial 
proceeding, however, may ultimately be denied, with Badesha and Sidhu 
now in their 70s and in poor health. 
                                                                                                             
116 See, for example, R. v. Shafia, [2016] O.J. No. 5627, 2016 ONCA 812 (Ont. C.A.). 
 
